Legislative History

Table of Contents

Cases

Lehigh Cement Limited v. Canada, 2010 DTC 5081 [at 6844], 2010 FCA 124

Sharlow, J.A. found that a statement in the Budget papers respecting the introduction of the withholding tax exemption in s. 212(1)(b)(viii), that the exemption would "facilitate access to funds from international markets" - did not establish that a transaction which did not result in the provision of funds to Canada from abroad was abusive. She stated (at para. 37) that "when Parliament adds an exemption to the Income Tax Act ... it cannot possibly describe every transaction within or without the intended scope of the exemption".

Locations of other summaries Wordcount
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 245 - Subsection 245(4) withholding exemption where no money raised not abusive 251

Canada (National Revenue) v. Greater Montréal Real Estate Board, 2008 DTC 6420, 2007 FCA 346

The Court inferred (para. 45) from the repeal of ss.231.2(3)(c) and (d) that in the provision as amended "Parliament permitted a type of fishing expedition ... all for the purpose of facilitating the MNR's access to information".

A.Y.S.A. Amateur Youth Soccer Association v. Canada (Canada Revenue Agency), 2006 DTC 6314, 2006 FCA 136

The legislative history of the rules applicable to registered Canadian amateur athletic associations showed that Parliament intended them to be a complete code of the circumstances in which such associations would be permitted to issue receipts to donors, with the result that the appellant could not seek qualification as a charitable organization even if under the common law of Ontario its objects of promoting soccer in Ontario would have qualified as charitable.

Canada v. Agazarian, 2004 DTC 6366, 2004 FCA 32

Pelletier J.A. applied the principle (at p. 6376) that "in order to ascertain Parliament's intent in enacting the provision, one may look to the former version of the text". Although there was an ambiguity in the current French version of s. 152(4)(b)(i) as to whether the Minister had the power to reassess more than once, this ambiguity was not present in both the French and English predecessor versions of that provision.

Manrell v. Canada, 2003 DTC 5225, 2003 FCA 128, rev'd 2003 DTC 5225, 2003 FCA 128

Comments made at the time of the enactment of the 1948 Act indicated that it was not intended to effect substantive tax reform. This, in turn, suggested that the addition in the definition of "property" of "a right of any kind whatsoever" did not introduce a departure from the previous meaning of the definition of property.

The Queen v. Vancouver Art Metal Works Ltd., 93 DTC 5116 (FCA)

LĂ©tourneau J.A. indicated that his view, that the phrase "trader or dealer in securities" in s. 39(5) was not restricted to dealers who are registered under provincial securities laws, was supported by the subsequent addition of section 47.1 to the Act, which confined that phrase to persons who are registered or licensed under the laws of a province to trade in securities. "Had Parliament intended a similar restrictive definition of trader or dealer to apply as well to paragraph 39(5)(a) it would have done so".

MNR v. Shawinigan Water and Power Co., 53 DTC 1036, [1953] CTC 37 (Ex Ct)

Any doubt as to the meaning of s. 6(1)(o) was "entirely removed by a consideration as to how the law stood and the state of things existing at the time para. (o) in its final form was enacted."

London County Council v. A.G., [1901] A.C. 26, 4 TC 265 (HL)

"[H]ow can you understand the true meaning and effect of an amendment unless you bear in mind the state of the law which it is proposed to amend?"

See Also

Entertainment Software Association v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 34, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 231

The Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada ("SOCAN") would negotiate with individual game publishers (collectively represented by the Appellant, the Entertainment Software Association ("ESA")) for rights to use SOCAN members' musical works in the games. Traditionally, these games would be distributed on physical media such as CDs. SOCAN sought a tariff from the Copyright Board on digital copies of games sold online, on the basis that it had given no permission in respect of its rights under s. 3(1)(f) of the Copyright Act:

(f) [Copyright includes the sole right,] in the case of any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, to communicate the work to the public by telecommunication... .

The Court granted the ESA's appeal and quashed the tariff on the basis that s. 3(1)(f) applies only to performances, not to reproductions. Because a digital download is meant to create a permanent copy on the users' machines, it is a reproduction rather than a performance.

Paragraph 3(1)(f) originally read:

(f) In case of any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, to communicate such work by radio communication.

SOCAN unsuccessfully argued that the expansion of s. 3(1)(f) to "telecommunication" demonstrates Parliament's intention to expand the communication right to technologies that involve transmitting data in a way that gives the end user a permanent copy of the work. The amendment was part of the 1988 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act. Before CUFTA, Canadian courts had found that "radio communications" covered Hertzian radio waves but not communication by co-axial cables. Under CUFTA, Canada was obligated to extend Copyright to transmission by co-axial cable as well.

Locations of other summaries Wordcount
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 212 - Subsection 212(1) - Paragraph 212(1)(d) - Subparagraph 212(1)(d)(vi) games downloading governed by reproduction rather than performance branch of copyright 391

Weyerhaeuser Company Limited v. The Queen, 2012 DTC 1132 [at 3166], 2012 TCC 106

Paris J. found that "logging operations" refers to "ongoing activities that are carried on by a taxpayer" (para. 50), and therefore the taxpayer could not claim federal logging tax credits in respect of any kind of capital disposition, pursuant to Regulation 700(1)(d)(i) (in this case, principally two BC saw mills.)

As an intervenor, British Columbia argued that the legislative history of Regulation 700 shows that extending the logging tax credits to capital gains would be more consistent with Parliament's intentions. The wording of s. 700(1)(d)(i) was not materially changed since its enactment in September 26, 1963, which predates the introduction of the capital gains tax in 1972. Parliament's apparent intention was to provide relief to forestry businesses from provincial forestry taxes, and taxpayers such as the appellant were made to pay taxes on their capital gains under the BC Logging Tax Act. Therefore, the intervenor argued, when Canada's income tax base was expanded to include a portion of capital gains, it must also have been Parliament's intention to expand its relief of taxes derived from that tax base, such as the logging tax.

Paris J. disagreed. Regulation 700(1) sets out a detailed definition of "income from logging operations," which shows a clear intention to limit the meaning of the term, not to allow it to expand. Moreover, as Paris J. had already concluded, logging operations could not reasonably encompass capital gains - he stated (at para. 91) that "it cannot be said that with the advent of capital gains tax Parliament was taxing a 'new area of logging income.'" Finally, the fact that capital gains were not taxed until long after the enactment of Regulation 700 meant that Parliament could not possible have intended at the time to provide relief for tax on capital gains, except insofar as they could reasonably be characterized as income from logging operations (i.e. not at all).