PIGEON,
J.
(all
concur)
:—This
appeal
is
from
a
judgment
of
the
Exchequer
Court,
Kerr,
J.,
affirming
a
decision
of
the
Tax
Appeal
Board
([1969]
Tax
A.B.C.
397)
which
upheld
the
Minister’s
re-assessment
of
appellant’s
income
tax
for
its
1962
taxation
year.
By
that
re-assessment
the
sum
of
$222,320.70
was
added
to
appellant’s
income
as
recovery
of
capital
cost
allowances.
At
the
commencement
of
its
1962
taxation
year,
appellant
then
known
as
Twin
Bridges
Sand
&
Gravel
Ltd.
was
carrying
on
the
business
of
mining,
processing
and
selling
sand
and
gravel
principally
in
the
immediate
vicinity
of
Edmonton.
The
mining
was
done
in
five
pits,
one
of
which
was
known
as
East
Side
Lands,
another
Entwistle
Lands,
and
the
three
others
as
Clover
Bar
Lands.
On
January
31,
1962
appellant
ceased
operations
having
sold
the
business
as
of
that
date
to
another
company
recently
incorporated
under
the
name
of
Twin
Bridges
Sand
and
Gravel
(1960)
Ltd.
This
sale
was
made
at
book
value
and
includes
all
appellant’s
assets,
except
the
above-mentioned
lands
in
which
mining
rights
only
were
transferred
to
the
new
company.
Subject
to
those
mining
rights,
the
lands,
which
appellant
owned
in
fee-simple,
were
sold
to
a
third
company,
Clover
Bar
Lands
Company
Ltd.
The
agreement
of
sale
is
dated
February
2,
1962
and
the
price
is
$761,841
for
which
appellant
agreed
to
accept
debentures.
These
were
not
in
fact
delivered
immediately
but
only
at
a
later
date
in
the
following
taxation
year.
The
Minister
took
the
view
that
the
sale
of
the
lands
was
a
disposition
of
‘‘depreciable
property’’
within
the
meaning
of
Section
20(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
and
that
the
amount
stated
in
the
agreement
as
the
sale
price
was
the
‘‘proceeds
of
disposition”
under
Section
20(5)(c).
This
resulted
in
the
addition
to
appellant’s
declared
income
of
the
aforementioned
sum
of
$222,320.70
as
“capital
cost
recovery
on
disposal
of
‘Schedule
E’
assets’’.
Appellant’s
first
ground
of
appeal
is
that
the
lands
were
not
depreciable
property.
Under
Income
Tax
Regulation
1100(1)
(g)
the
depreciable
property
is
‘‘an
industrial
mineral
mine’’
and
the
subject-matter
of
the
sale
was
land
that
could
not,
it
is
contended,
be
said
to
be
a
mine
because
the
mining
rights
had
been
previously
severed
from
the
fee
and
transferred
to
another
company.
It
is
also
urged
that
under
Schedule
E,
as
it
then
read,
the
allowance
contemplated
in
the
regulation
is
to
be
computed
by
reference
to
the
capital
cost
of
the
mineral
rights
only,
because
the
allowance
is
required
to
be
computed
on
the
basis
of
a
rate
that
is
determined
after
subtracting
from
the
capital
cost
of
the
mine
the
‘‘residual
value’’
which
is
defined
as
‘‘the
estimated
value
of
the
property
if
all
commercially
mining
materials
were
removed’’.
It
is
submitted
that
this
means
that
no
capital
cost
allowance
or
depreciation
is
allowed
on
the
residual
value.
The
first
question
is
therefore
as
to
the
meaning
of
the
word
“mine”
in
the
relevant
regulation
and
Schedule.
Does
it
mean,
as
appellant
contends,
the
mineral
deposits
only
or
does
it,
in
a
case
like
this,
mean
the
land
on
which
the
mineral
deposit
is
found?
There
can
be
no
doubt
that
when
appellant,
or
its
predecessor,
acquired
each
of
the
five
mines
with
which
we
are
concerned,
what
it
bought
was
land
with
mineral
deposits
included.
This
is
clearly
shown
to
be
the
usual
method
of
operation
in
that
business,
and
it
is
also
what
Schedule
E
contemplates.
There
would
be
no
residual
value
if
mineral
rights
only
were
acquired.
While
it
is
true
that
such
residual
value
must
be
deducted
from
the
cost
of
the
property
in
establishing
the
rate
of
capital
cost
allowance,
this
allowance
is
not
expressed
to
be
granted
in
respect
of
anything
but
the
‘‘property’’,
that
is
an
“industrial
mineral
mine”.
In
M.N.R.
v.
MacLean
Mining
Co.
Ld.,
[1970]
C.T.C.
264,
this
Court
was
required
to
interpret
the
word
‘‘mine’’
in
Section
83(9)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
It
was
held
that
it
could
not
be
interpreted
as
meaning
‘‘a
portion
of
the
earth
containing
mineral
deposits’’
and
it
was
also
indicated
that
it
rather
meant
“a
mining
concern
taken
as
a
whole,
comprising
mineral
deposits,
workings,
equipment
and
machinery,
capable
of
producing
ore’’.
It
must,
however,
be
noted
that
this
was
based
on
the
context
of
the
specific
section
under
consideration
in
which
subsection
(6)(a)
specifically
excludes
among
other
things
“sand
pit,
gravel
pit’’.
The
context
of
the
provisions
relevant
to
this
ease
is
quite
different.
Instead
of
metal
mines
that
are
usually
acquired
in
the
form
of
mining
rights,
we
are
here
dealing
with
“industrial
mineral
mines”
that
are
almost
invariably
obtained
by
purchasing
the
fee.
Also,
a
completely
different
system
of
allowance
is
involved,
namely
depreciation
not
depletion.
In
the
context
of
Schedule
EK,
it
is
apparent
that
the
word
‘‘mine’’
is
not
taken
in
its
usual
meaning
as
applied
to
metal
mines
but
in
a
special
meaning
as
part
of
the
expression
‘‘industrial
mineral
mine’’.
With
respect
to
metal
mines,
it
was
pointed
out
that
‘‘a
portion
of
the
earth
containing
mineral
deposits”
was
not
the
usual
meaning
of
the
word
mine.
Here,
it
must
be
noted
that
the
word
‘‘mine’’
is
not
in
common
use
to
describe
a
sand
or
gravel
pit.
This
is
therefore
a
case
where
the
word
is
obviously
not
taken
in
the
usual
sense.
Everything
in
Schedule
E
indicates
that
it
is
taken
as
meaning
a
portion
of
the
earth
containing
mineral
deposits.
This
is
especially
apparent
from
the
definition
of
‘‘residual
value’’,
bearing
in
mind
that
Section
2(a)
[thereof]
shows
that
the
“property”
means
the
mine
’
\
2.
The
rate
for
a
taxation
year
is
(a)
if
the
taxpayer
has
not
been
granted
an
allowance
in
respect
of
the
mine
for
any
previous
year,
an
amount
determined
by
dividing
the
capital
cost
to
the
taxpayer
minus
the
residual
value
by
the
total
number
of
units
of
commercially
mineable
material
estimated
as
being
in
the
property,
and
.
.
.
(Italics
added.)
In
Highway
Sawmills
Lid.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1966]
S.C.R.
384;
[1966]
C.T.C.
150,
this
Court
held
that
recapture
provisions
were
applicable
with
respect
to
a
timber
limit
sold
after
all
merchantable
timber
had
been
removed.
Regulation
1100(1)
(e)
and
Schedule
C
respecting
timber
limits
almost
exactly
parallel
Regulation
1100(1)
(g)
and
Schedule
E.
The
only
significant
difference
is
that
reference
is
made
not
only
to
‘‘a
timber
limit”
but
also
to
‘‘the
right
to
cut
timber
from
a
limit”.
This
difference
does
not
appear
material
and
it
could
not
affect
the
result
in
the
case,
seeing
that
the
property
was
land
held
in
fee
simple
as
in
this
case.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
sought
to
distinguish
the
decision
by
reason
of
the
fact
that
in
that
case
capital
cost
allowance
had
been
claimed
and
allowed
on
the
basis
that
there
was
no
residual
value,
the
taxpayer
being
in
the
habit
of
letting
such
lands
be
sold
for
taxes
after
the
removal
of
the
merchantable
timber.
In
my
view
the
distinction
is
invalid
because
the
basis
of
the
decision
was
the
construction
and
effect
of
the
relevant
regulation
and
Schedule,
and
this
was
not
affected
by
the
circumstance
that
the
residual
value
had
been
considered
nonexistent.
Nothing
can
justify
the
assumption
that
by
setting
up
a
residual
value
a
taxpayer
is
freed
from
the
application
of
the
provisions
for
recapture.
Such
value
is
nothing
more
than
an
estimate;
it
is.
not
a
separate
item
of
property.
The
second
ground
of
appeal
was
that,
because
the
sale
price
was
payable
by
means
of
debentures,
it
should
not
be
considered
as
being
the
amount
of
money
stated
in
the
agreement
but
the
value
of
the
debentures.
Such
value
was
not
established
although
an
attempt
was
made
to
prove
by
witnesses
that
they
were
worthless.
In
my
view,
Kerr,
J.
was
quite
correct
in
disregarding
that
evidence.
It
is
clear
that,
although
the
debentures
in
question
were
not
readily
marketable,
they
were
of
substantial
value,
and
it
was
not
shown
that
their
value
to
the
appellant
was
less
than
the
capital
cost
of
the
property
sold.
Furthermore,
by
virtue
of
Section
20(5)(e)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
“
“proceeds
of
disposition’
of
property
include
(i)
the
sale
price
of
property
that
has
been
sold’’.
Reference
was
made
in
argument
to
Section
24(1)
which
reads
as
follows:
24.
(1)
Where
a
person
has
received
a
security
or
other
right
or
a
certificate
of
indebtedness
or
other
evidence
of
indebtedness
wholly
or
partially
as
or
in
lieu
of
payment
of
or
in
satisfaction
of
an
interest,
dividend
or
other
debt
that
was
then
payable
and
the
amount
of
which
would
be
included
in
computing
his
income
if
it
had
been
paid,
the
value
of
the
security,
right
or
indebtedness
or
the
applicable
portion
thereof
shall,
notwithstanding
the
form
or
legal
effect
of
the
transaction,
be
included
in
computing
his
income
for
the
taxation
year
in
which
it
was
received;
and
a
payment
in
redemption
of
the
security,
satisfaction
of
the
right
or
discharge
of
the
indebtedness
shall
not
be
included
in
computing
the
recipient’s
income.
That
section
can
have
no
application
in
this
case
because
the
payment
for
which
appellant
has
received
the
debentures
is
not
one
which
would
be
included
in
computing
its
income.
If
such
was
the
case,
the
full
amount,
less
the
‘‘residual
value’’,
would
have
to
be
added
to
its
income
instead
of
the
recapture
of
capital
cost
allowance
only.
In
my
view,
this
observation
also
disposes
of
the
last
ground
of
appeal
which
was
that
the
proceeds
of
the
disposition
were
not
received
in
appellant’s
taxation
year
1962
because
the
debentures
were
delivered
only
some
time
after
the
end
of
that
vear.
The
date
of
delivery
of
the
debentures
would
be
material
only
if
the
assessment
was
made
by
application
of
Section
24(1).
Here,
as
a
result
of
the
execution
of
the
contract
for
the
sale
of
the
lands,
appellant
immediately
acquired
a
right
to
receive
the
price
fixed
in
the
contract.
By
virtue
of
Section
20(5)
(c)
this
is
‘‘proceeds
of
disposition’’.
When
depreciable
property
is
acquired,
the
fact
that
the
price
may
be
payable
in
whole
or
in
part
at
a
later
date
does
not,
as
a
rule,
deprive
the
taxpayer
of
the
right
to
claim
capital
cost
allowance
on
the
full
price.
We
have
no
need
to
consider
if
the
situation
may
be
different
in
the
case
of
taxpayers
reporting
on
a
‘‘cash
basis
’
’
;
here
it
is
conceded
that
appellant
is
on
the
‘‘accrual
basis’’.
It
is
therefore
hard
to
see
how
it
can
be
contended
that
it
is
wrong
to
assess
for
recapture
in
the
year
of
sale
irrespective
of
the
date
on
which
the
proceeds
of
disposition
are
actually
payable.
This
would
be
material
only
if
the
sale
had
been
made
‘‘in
the
course
of
a
business’’,
as
it
is
only
in
such
case
that
a
reserve
is
permitted
by
Section
85B(1)(d).
Counsel
for
the
appellant
effectively
abandoned
any
contention
that
this
provision
could
have
any
application
by
stating
that
it
was
not
contended
that
the
sale
was
made
in
the
course
of
a
business.
Finally,
it
must
be
noted
that
Section
11
(3d)
clearly
implies
that
‘‘
proceeds
of
disposition
of
depreciable
property’’
include
a
sale
price
payable
at
a
later
date,
because
provision
is
made
for
a
deduction
in
the
year
in
which
this
becomes
a
bad
debt.
For
those
reasons,
the
appeal
should
be
dismissed
with
costs.