Citation: 2013 TCC 283
Date: 20130912
Docket: 2012-4580(GST)I
BETWEEN:
DARLA A. PLISKOW,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered orally from the Bench
on August 23, 2013, in London, Ontario.)
Pizzitelli J.
[1]
The Appellant appeals
an assessment by the Minister of National Revenue (the “Minister”) for
$67,318.43 dated August 31, 2010, against her pursuant to subsection 325(1) of
the Excise Tax Act of Canada (the “Act”) involving a non‑arm’s
length transfer on November 12, 2008, by her husband to her of his undivided
50% interest in their residence in London, Ontario, at a time her husband had a
tax liability owing on account of his joint and several liability as a director
of a corporation for such corporation’s GST tax liability. The corporation’s
liability was in excess of that amount but the husband’s liability as director
was frozen as of the date he made a consumer proposal pursuant to the Bankruptcy
and Insolvency Act of Canada on January 20, 2010.
[2]
Most of the facts in
this matter are not in dispute. The Appellant and her husband were married at
the time of the transfer of the property and are still married, never having
been separated or divorced in the interim. The Appellant has worked for a large
insurance company, London Life, since 1984 as a software programmer and her
husband has been self-employed as an investment advisor or agent since 1994 but
since 2004 with World Source Securities, operating the insurance part of the
business under the name Dardan Capital Group (“Dardan”).
[3]
The Appellant and her
husband purchased the home in London that is the subject matter of the transfer
on September 22, 1988, as joint tenants with the help of a mortgage from the Appellant’s
employer for $65,000 which was paid off and discharged by May of 2000. The Appellant
and her husband also arranged for a joint line of credit from TD Canada Trust
for $78,000 secured by a mortgage on their home which was primarily used for
their investment in Carriage Properties Inc. (“Carriage”), a corporation which
purchased a commercial property out of which the husband and others operated
their businesses. The Appellant and her husband each owned 25% of the shares in
Carriage. The evidence is also that this line of credit was used to renovate
the husband’s offices and for business purposes, namely to fund expenses when
income from his self-employment was low until it could be repaid.
[4]
In December of 2002,
the pair obtained a joint line of credit from Manulife Financial having a
limit of $202,500 secured by a mortgage on their jointly-owned home from which it
paid off the TD Canada Trust line of credit then standing at $74,188.00. The
Appellant testified the new line had a larger credit limit that was not
intended to be initially used other than for possible family emergencies but
the Appellant’s husband testified the intention was to use such line along the
lines they used the former TD Canada Trust line, namely to include a business
purpose which the Appellant denies.
[5]
The terms of the
Manulife line of credit was that either the Appellant or her husband could draw
on it and under paragraph 2.3.2 thereof they were responsible for monitoring
the credit limit. More specifically, paragraph 2.3.2 of the Operating Agreement
reads as follows:
2.3.2 You
agree that we need not warn you when you come close to or go over your credit
limit. In particular, you must ensure that the balance under your Manulife One
Account always remains low enough so that your credit limit allows you to make
expected and any unexpected expenses from the account before you receive your
next income payment.
[6]
Notwithstanding the
joint line of credit terms, the evidence is that the husband, with the Appellant’s
agreement, was in charge of that account and was given responsibility for
monitoring and keeping the cheques used to draw on the account until the time
the property was transferred to the Appellant after which no further cheques
were drawn on the line account.
[7]
In addition to the
$74,188 payout of the TD Canada Trust line of credit from the Manulife line of
credit, the Appellant’s husband drew 14 cheques in total over the period from
January 13, 2003 to October 7, 2008, ending shortly before the transfer of the
property in issue, totalling almost $295,000 which the Appellant testified were
without her permission. There were a large number of smaller entries on the
Bank Statements for the line tendered into evidence by the Appellant showing
repayment instalments, interest charges and service fees, which kept the account
within the $202,500 limit for almost that entire period. There was no
explanation of the source these deposits came from either the Appellant or her
husband.
[8]
Of the 14 cheques
written by the Appellant’s husband, the first three were written within the
first three months of establishing the new line of credit totalling about
$28,500 for which no explanation was proffered either. In 2003, four cheques
were written to 1537462 Ontario Inc (“153”) a corporation of which both the Appellant’s
husband and Carriage each had a 15% interest, totalling $81,400 as well as a
cheque to an entity called Hollywood Tan for $11,000; all marked as loans or
testified to as such by the couple. In 2005, only one cheque for $7,500 was
written to an entity called Atlantic Packaging Products Ltd. as a loan, a corporation
in which neither the Appellant nor her husband apparently had any interest.
In 2007, a cheque was drawn to the joint chequing account the Appellant
and her husband had with the Royal Bank from which was then drawn a cheque to
purchase a car for the Appellant’s husband. In 2006, one cheque was issued to
Stone Crest Homes Ltd., a corporation owned entirely by the Appellant’s husband
(“Stone Crest”) for $34,000 and in 2008 three further cheques were issued
to Stone Crest totalling $87,000. Finally, in October of 2008, two cheques
were issued to Dardan, the Appellant’s husband’s business, totalling $9,200.
[9]
The Appellant testified
she became aware the line of credit had reached its limit after her husband
drew the first of his cheques to Stone Crest in 2006 and advised her husband
that she did not approve asking him not to write further cheques. Her evidence
is also that she was aware that by October of 2007 the line of credit balance
had been reduced to about $88,000 but took no steps to reduce the line of
credit or take control of the cheque book to reduce further risk to her,
testifying she was prepared to give her husband another chance.
[10]
It should be noted that
Stone Crest was incorporated in 2005 to develop a townhouse condominium project
in London, Ontario. The evidence of the husband is that he had engaged other
parties to operate the project but found out they had been stealing from Stone
Crest by ordering supplies for other projects on its account or underreporting
expenses for his payment which resulted in substantial unpaid liabilities. In
2007, he fired those parties and took over the running of the project himself.
Stone Crest experienced financial difficulties with the project for a number of
reasons, causing its suppliers and creditors to commence or threaten lien and
collection action, ultimately leading to its cessation of business and the
bankruptcy filing of the husband personally. In order to deal with the
creditors in an honourable way, the husband wrote cheques on the Manulife line
of credit to Stone Crest in 2008 without his wife’s knowledge, according to his
testimony, to fund its obligations effectively maximizing the line usage a
second time.
Position of the Parties
[11]
The Appellant takes the
position that she did not authorize the cheques written by her husband on the
Manulife line of credit account; that these cheques were for the sole benefit
of her husband and that these constitute an unjust enrichment to him qualifying
her to treat her husband’s interest in the property transferred to her as
belonging to her under a constructive trust or constituting consideration she
paid for the transfer. In the alternative, she argues that these cheques
represent loans made by her husband which were not repaid and thus should be
treated as loans by her to her husband from her share of the account. The Appellant
also takes the position that the fair market value of the London home property
on the date of transfer was only $332,000 and not $355,000, before deduction of
liabilities thereon and division for her share thereof.
[12]
The Respondent takes
the position the Appellant paid no consideration for the transfer of her
husband’s interest in the property to her beyond the $2.00 evidenced on the
Deed of Transfer and that the fair market value of the house was as assessed,
at $355,000, arguing that there was no constructive trust and that this Court
does not have the jurisdiction to grant the declarative relief of finding there
was a constructive trust.
The Law
[13]
As mentioned above, this
is an assessment against the Appellant pursuant to section 325 of the Act,
cascading to her as a result of her husband’s director’s liability with regards
to unpaid GST of Stone Crest pursuant to section 323 of the Act.
[14]
It is clear that
section 323 places a joint and several liability on directors of the
corporation to pay the amount that a corporation fails to remit under the Act.
It is also clear that such liability arises at the time of the failure to
remit, not the time the certificate for the amount of the corporation’s
liability has been registered in Federal Court as confirmed in Filippazzo v
R, 2000 DTC 2326.
[15]
As a condition to
assessing director’s liability, subsection 323(2) requires that certain steps
be taken including that a certificate for the amount of the corporation’s
liability has been registered in Federal Court and execution for that amount
has been returned unsatisfied. The evidence of the Respondent clearly shows
that the Federal Court Certificate was issued for $71,005.78 on March 18, 2010
and that the Writ of Seizure and Sale was issued on that date and returned
nulla bona thereafter and that the corporation is still indebted to Canada
Revenue Agency (“CRA”) for an amount far in excess of the sum contained in the
certificate to this day. As a result of the Appellant’s spouse having made a
consumer proposal pursuant to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act on
January 20, 2010, the amount owing to the CRA is reduced to $67,318.48 as of
that date, in effect by the amount of the GST assessed against Stone Crest for
the period in 2009 following such proposal date and the amount of interest
charged against Stone Crest for the period during which the proposal was filed
as required. Although not challenged by the Appellant, it should be noted that
I agree with the Respondent that it is of no consequence that the Federal
Certificate and Writ of Seizure and Sale were issued after the date the
consumer proposal was made as there is no requirement in the language of the Act
that requires it to be made beforehand, only that it be made as a condition of
enforcement against the transferor.
[16]
It should also be noted
that neither the Appellant nor her husband challenged the husband’s director’s
liability which was assumed by the Respondent in its Reply nor was there even a
suggestion of a due diligence defence.
[17]
Subsection 325(1)
imposes a joint and several liability for unpaid GST on a transferee of
property from a transferor if four conditions are met:
1.
there must be transfer
of property;
2.
the transferor and
transferee must have been dealing at arm’s length or not have been spouses or
common-law partners;
3.
there must have been no
consideration or inadequate consideration given by the transferee to the
transferor; and
4.
the transferor must
have been liable to pay or remit an amount under this Act for the
reporting period in which the transfer occurs or any preceding reporting
period.
[18]
There is no question or
dispute that the Appellant’s spouse transferred his undivided 50% interest in
the property to the Appellant on November 12, 2012, as evidenced by a Deed
registered on title. There is also no dispute the Appellant as transferee was
at the time of transfer, and still is, the spouse of the transferor.
[19]
As indicated above, the
transferor is liable to pay CRA the sum of $67,318.48 by way of director’s
liability pursuant to subsection 323(1) in relation to the period of filing in
which the transfer of property occurred and for previous periods, clearly established
by the evidence of the Respondent’s witness and not challenged by the Appellant.
Accordingly, the Respondent had met its onus to provide prima facie
evidence of the existence of the tax liability of the transferor as mandated by
Archambault J. in Gestion Yvan Drouin Inc. v Canada, [2001] 2 CTC 2315,
and the Appellant has not provided any evidence to rebut such evidence.
[20]
The major dispute in
this case centres on the issue of whether any consideration was given for the
transfer and of course the fair market value of the property transferred which
affects the limit of the Appellant’s liability, if any, pursuant to the formula
under section 325 which deducts the value of any consideration given to the
transferor from the fair market value of the property transferred.
Consideration
[21]
As previously
indicated, the Appellant argues that due to the doctrine of constructive trust
the Appellant obtained an interest in her husband’s one-half share of the home
by the amount of the cheques drawn by her husband on the Manulife line of credit
account without her permission and for his sole benefit. In the alternative,
she argues certain of these unauthorized cheques made payable to Stone Crest
and totalling $121,000 constitute a loan by her to her husband and hence
constitute consideration paid for his interest.
[22]
As the Appellant has
argued, the Supreme Court of Canada in Pettkus v Becker, [1980] 2 SCR
834, adopted in Peter v Beblow, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980, held that the elements
of a constructive trust are (1) unjust enrichment; (2) a corresponding
deprivation; and (3) a lack of juristic reason for the enrichment.
[23]
The Appellant has
argued this Court has applied the doctrine of constructive trust on a few
occasions since the decision of former Chief Justice Bowman in Angela Savoie
v Her Majesty the Queen, 93 DTC 552, who stated that the doctrine goes to
the determination of the true ownership of the property and accordingly is
germane in allowing the court to meet its obligation of determining true
ownership in a dispute. The Appellant in fact relies on the decision of Webb J.
in Darte v Canada, 2008 TCC 66, 2008 DTC 2567, and Rossiter A.C.J.
in Vidamour v Canada, 2009 TCC 414, 2009 DTC 1279, the latter
relying on the first; which in fact decided that the consideration amounted to
the Appellant having established that they would have had a right to the
declarative relief of constructive trust and hence the surrender of such right
amounted to consideration for the transfer.
[24]
The Respondent argues
that Webb J. in Darte above considered a more detailed analysis of the
doctrine than Savoie and found in fact that this Court had no
jurisdiction to make a declarative relief of constructive trust. In paragraph
21, Webb J. stated:
21. As
this Court is not a court of equity, the equitable remedy of constructive trust
cannot be granted by this Court.
[25]
It seems there is some
confusion in this Court on the matter. While I acknowledge Savoie
directly relied on the doctrine in a tax matter and Darte and Vidamour
acknowledge the doctrine but found the giving up of a right to secure such
declarative remedy was sufficient consideration, I personally am of the view
this Court has no jurisdiction pursuant to section 12 of the Tax Court of
Canada Act to determine property rights between two parties, particularly
when one of the parties is not a party to the action. This jurisdiction in my
view falls to the Superior Court of each province or designated competent Court.
I agree with the conclusion of Webb J. in Darte that this Court cannot
grant the remedy of constructive trust but not because of a general statement
it is not a court of equity, as in my opinion, equitable doctrines often
pervade decisions of this Court, including those of estoppel, counter attack
and abuse of process, but because such property matters involve two parties,
one of whom is not before this Court, in determining matters within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Superior Courts as indicated and that require
consideration of a totality of evidence from both such parties. I share the
view expressed by Sarchuk J. as early as in his 1990 decision of Nelson v The
Minister of National Revenue, 91 DTC 37 at paragraph 22 and again in his
decision John Karavos v R, 96 DTC 1001 where he stated at paragraph
28:
28. A
constructive trust is a mechanism by virtue of which a court with equitable
jurisdiction can grant redress to an unjustly deprived person. In determining
whether unjust enrichment exists and restitution through the invocation of a
constructive trust is appropriate a court may take into account the deprived
person’s actual financial contributions, (which may properly include the
contributions of earnings towards household bills and maintenance), all work
performed in relation to the property, both physical and otherwise, and other
factors as the performance of housekeeping duties, the raising of children etc.
The result is that effectively a court is required to embark on an
examination of the totality of the marital relationship extending over a period
of 30 years to determine whether an unjust enrichment occurred and whether it
would be appropriately remedied by a declaratory order vesting the claimant with
title to property or by granting a monetary award. In my view such an inquiry
is inappropriate in an income tax context. The use of a restitutory device to
remedy situations of unjust enrichment should not be equated with the
determination of a collateral issue necessary in order for this Court to carry
out its statutory function, that is, to dismiss or allow an appeal or vacate or
vary an assessment.
[26]
In the case at hand,
the Appellant argues that her husband was unjustly enriched for withdrawing
more from their joint line of credit than his share in the equity of their
home. The evidence, however, also suggests that her husband earned substantially
more income than her as he reported income of approximately $229,000 in 2007,
approximately $200,000 in 2008 and $142,000 in 2009 while the Appellant provided
evidence that she earned approximately $85,000 in 2013 for the same employer
she worked for throughout the years her husband reported his higher self-employed
income as aforesaid. In determining whether there was unjust enrichment should
I not consider higher contribution to the family pool as well as higher
withdrawals as the Appellant asks? If the husband’s withdrawals and
contributions are the only evidence before me would it not be reasonable to
assume he might be capable of arguing for a larger slice of the property to the
comfort of CRA? No doubt if the Appellant and her husband were in an adversarial
position instead of in a pooled income arrangement facing a loss of further
equity, they would be arguing all the factors that might affect their
respective positions as contemplated by Sarchuk J. in Karavos above.
This demonstrates why this Court cannot be the best forum for such argument,
being availed of only part if not a fraction of the evidence that can possibly
exist to determine the issue.
[27]
I should also add that
I cannot agree that the Appellant paid any consideration by granting her husband
any forbearance or waiver of her rights to seek the remedy of constructive
trust as was found in Darte and Vidamour above. The Federal Court
of Appeal was clear in Livingston v Canada, 2008 FCA 89, 2008 DTC 6233, that
while forbearance, “the act of refraining from enforcing a right, obligation or
debt ‑ can act as consideration for a promise given in return” there must
be a legal forbearance to do so. There is simply no evidence in this matter of
any contract, waiver or other agreement that the Appellant has agreed to
refrain from pursuing her right to declarative relief under the doctrine of
constructive trust. The fact she has not done so and still has that option if
she wishes to pursue it in the Superior Court of Justice suggests otherwise.
The fact she is asking this Court to invoke a remedy she is not prepared to
seek before a court having jurisdiction to deal with it only serves to confirm
my view that the Appellant does not consider herself to be deprived or her
husband to be unjustly enriched from his actions.
[28]
Notwithstanding my
opinion however, it is not necessary for me to determine this issue in more
detail as even if I were to give the Appellant the benefit of applying Savoie,
I could not possibly find in the facts herein that there was any unjust
enrichment to the Appellant’s husband nor deprivation to the Appellant as a
result. The evidence is clear that the Appellant and her husband pooled their
incomes for the benefit of their families and divided their family and
financial responsibilities by agreement. The testimony of both the Appellant
and her husband was consistent in that the financial responsibility for the
oversight and control of the Manulife line of credit was with the husband with
the Appellant’s expressed approval. She testified that not only did he start
off with this responsibility but that she elected to continue to allow him to
keep the cheque book even after she became aware that he had been writing
cheques; had maximized the use of the line of credit and then had paid it down
to approximately $88,000 in 2007. She failed to take any steps to avoid risk
nor took the opportunity to remedy the situation when the line of credit had
returned close to the initial amount used to pay off the TD Canada Trust line of
credit it replaced. I fail to see how a party can be unjustly enriched when he
is given carte blanche to draw on a line of credit with the tacit approval of
the party alleging she was deprived especially when the party deprived agrees
to risk being deprived again after being given the chance to avoid the
deprivation.
[29]
The Appellant stood to
gain from the husband’s actions and investments due to their pooling
arrangement and must suffer the downside of any such arrangement in the
circumstances. The evidence is that several cheques were written to 153, a
corporation in which both the husband and Carriage had a total of 30% of the
shares. Moreover, even with regard to the cheques written to Stone Crest, it is
clear that the Appellant knew of her husband’s investment in Stone Crest and
that the couple were in an arrangement of pooling their wealth. I find it
difficult to find unjust enrichment when one of the parties holds title to an
asset for the benefit of all. The Appellant even suggested that the funds drawn
to ultimately purchase her husband’s vehicle was an unjust enrichment yet
admits she rented her cars and thus was provided a vehicle from the family
assets while a cheque drawn from the Manulife line of credit account to the
couple’s joint Royal Bank account, of which she presumably would have access to
records and statements, and from there to buy a vehicle to be mainly driven by
the husband but which she also admitted having driven, was inappropriate.
Frankly, I find this incredulous in the context of a pooled wealth and income
arrangement they both admitted existed.
[30]
The Appellant suggested
that the Manulife line of credit was not to be used for business but as
mentioned earlier, the first withdrawal from that line of credit was to pay off
the TD Canada Trust line of credit which had also been used for her husband’s
business. Moreover, when the Appellant became aware that the line of credit had
been fully utilized from her husband’s cheques and then repaid to the $88,000
level in 2007 before increasing again due mainly to his loans to Stone Crest,
how did the Appellant think the paydown of the line of credit occurred? It only
stands to reason that her husband or his business was the source of those
paydown funds and so she must have known the line of credit account was being
used for business, at least at that point, as was the TD Canada Trust line of
credit before that.
[31]
In my opinion, this is
a spouse leaving her husband in charge of finances, demonstrating almost wilful
blindness to her financial affairs due to her trust and confidence in him and
then arguing unjust enrichment when his investment decisions did not pan out. This
is not a situation where the doctrine of constructive trust would be applicable.
I do not find there was any consideration paid by the Appellant to her husband
as a result of any constructive trust.
Loan Consideration
[32]
The Appellant also
argued in the alternative that the loans her husband made to Stone Crest
totalling $121,000 without her knowledge and which were not repaid should be
treated as loans or indebtedness owed by her husband to her as consideration
for the transfer. There is no dispute between the parties that loans or
indebtedness owing by the transferor to a transferee can be considered
consideration paid for a transfer for the purposes of subsection 325(1).
However, I fail to see how loans made by the husband to Stone Crest from
the Manulife line of credit account which the Appellant testified she had no
knowledge of and which occurred without her consent can magically become a loan
made by him to her. There is no evidence of any loan between the Appellant and
her husband; no evidence of even any discussion at the time suggesting any
portion of these payments would be treated in this way as between them.
[33]
Having regard to the
above, I find that the Appellant has not rebutted the Minister’s assumption in
the Reply that the only consideration given for the transfer of the property by
her to her husband, the transferor, was $2.00.
Valuation Issue
[34]
Finally, the Appellant
challenges the limit of her liability under the formula found in subsection
325(1), namely on the basis that CRA overvalued the home that is the subject matter
of the transfer. Under section 325, a transferee of property will be liable to
the CRA to the extent that the fair market value of the consideration given for
the property falls short of the fair market value of the property.
[35]
The Minister assumed in
its Reply that at the time of transfer the market value of the subject property
was at least $355,000, the fair market value of all mortgages and other
encumbrances was $200,658.74 and that the transferor’s interest was at least
$77,170.63, being one-half of the equity. The Minister also assumed the fair
market value of the consideration given for the transfer of her husband’s
interest was $2.00.
[36]
The only assumption
left for the Appellant to challenge is whether the fair market value of the
subject property was $355,000. It is clear that the onus to demolish the
Minister’s assumptions as to value rests with the Appellant as confirmed
recently in Abdulnour v Canada, 2013 TCC 34, [2013] GSTC 18, relying on
the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Hickman Motors Ltd. v Canada,
[1997] 2 S.C.R. 336, which sets out the general principle that the initial onus of
demolishing the Minister’s assumptions rest with the taxpayer.
[37]
In the case at hand, I
am of the view that the Appellant has met the initial onus of demolishing the
Minister’s assumption that the fair market value of the property at the time of
transfer was $355,000. The Appellant submitted evidence that the Minister’s
assumption was too high based on the Municipal Property Assessment
Corporation’s (“MPAC”) assessment for 2008 of $332,000 as well as evidence from
the local newspaper, the London Free Press November 2012 article that stated
London values grew by only 10.9% over the four-year span from 2008. This was
supported by an MPAC community snapshot article dated July 2012 that stated:
Despite
a rare dip during the 2008 recession and the loss of two major industrial employers,
average real estate prices in London have recovered and are continuing to
increase at their traditional rate of about 2% to 3% per year, according to
Barb Whitney, President of the London and St. Thomas Real Estate Board.
[38]
As further support for
the fact a recession occurred in 2008, the Appellant submitted into evidence a
Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation Housing Market Outlook for London, Ontario, as at October 17, 2012, which indicated that the average price in London dropped in the fourth quarter of 2008 from an average of about $220,000 to $200,000
or by 10%.
[39]
The onus to establish
the value then shifted to the Respondent, who called two expert witnesses who
were appraisers with the CRA who, using the comparative analysis approach in comparing
six like sales of the 2008 and early 2009 years opined that the value of the property
at the time of sale was $355,000, the figure used by the CRA in the
reassessment in issue.
[40]
The first expert
witness testified as to the value and on cross-examination agreed that economic
conditions might affect the value of property but maintained it was not so for
the neighbourhood where the subject property is situate, testifying that in
effect this neighbourhood did not suffer the effects of the recession to the
same extent as prima facie evidenced by the Appellant’s testimony, but provided
no details or evidence or comparisons as to why? The Respondent’s second expert
witness, who co-signed the first expert witness’ report because he had not
obtained his appraisal credentials at the time of conducting the appraisal ‑
something counsel for the Respondent failed to point out to the Court while
qualifying the witness ‑ testified that in fact most
neighbourhoods are affected in the same manner by economic conditions. He too
testified he did not conduct a specific analysis of such economic conditions.
It is also clear that half the comparables sold in the first three-quarters of
2008 making averaging somewhat suspect.
[41]
Frankly, the testimony
of the Respondent’s expert witnesses is in my view contradictory and no
evidence was led to demonstrate why the Appellant’s residence would not be
affected to the same degree as the remaining neighbourhoods in London, Ontario. In these circumstances, I must find that the Respondent has not succeeded
in rebutting the evidence of the Appellant as to the value and find the value
to be $332,000. The fact the residence sold for $365,000 in October of 2012
suggests that in 2008, four years earlier, it was only worth about $329,000 or
so. Notwithstanding the Respondent’s expert witness testimony that the MPAC
assessment was outdated, the remaining evidence still collaborates to my
satisfaction that the property was only worth $332,000 as per the Appellant’s
position.
[42]
Accordingly, the Minister
is ordered to reassess the Appellant on the basis the fair market value of the
subject property at the time of transfer was only $332,000, and thus, net of
outstanding encumbrances, the transferor’s interest in the subject property was
$65,670.63.
Signed
at Ottawa, Canada, this 12th day of September 2013.
“F.J. Pizzitelli”