Supreme Court of Canada
Diewold v. Diewold, [1941] S.C.R. 35
Date: 1940-12-20
Joseph P. Diewold (Defendant)
Appellant;
and
Peter J. Diewold (Plaintiff)
Respondent.
1940: October 15; 1940: December 20.
Present: Duff C.J. and Rinfret, Crocket, Hudson and Taschereau JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR
SASKATCHEWAN.
Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934 (Dom.,
c. 53)—Sale of land—Action by vendor against purchaser under agreement of sale—Order
nisi—Effect of terms thereof—Subsequent formulation and confirmation of
proposal by Board of Review under said Act—Validity or invalidity of proposal—Existence
or non-existence of a "debt."
Plaintiff, vendor, sued upon an agreement of
sale of land on which defendant, purchaser, had made default in payment. Plaintiff
claimed: specific performance; payment of arrears and interest due, and, under
an acceleration clause, payment of the balance of purchase price; in default of
payment, cancellation of the agreement and forfeiture of moneys paid
thereunder; immediate possession of the land. Defendant did not defend and
plaintiff obtained an order nisi which fixed the amount due at
$8,804.64, of which $4,104.64 was in arrear; ordered that defendant pay into
court by a certain date $4,104.64 and interest and costs to be taxed; that in
default of payment the agreement be cancelled and determined and all moneys
paid thereunder be forfeited and retained by plaintiff; provided that upon
payment of $4,104.64 (the sum in arrear) and interest, defendant be relieved
from immediate payment of what had not become payable by lapse of time; and
ordered that plaintiff have immediate possession of the land. Subsequently to
said order nisi and before expiry of the time for payment thereunder,
the Board of Review, under the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934 (Dom.,
c. 53), formulated a proposal reducing the amount owing to plaintiff and
extending the time for payment, which proposal was rejected by plaintiff but
confirmed by the Board. Thereafter plaintiff issued a writ of possession, which
was executed by the sheriff who placed plaintiff in possession. Defendant moved
to set aside the writ of possession. The Local Master dismissed the motion. His
order was reversed by Bigelow J. ([1940] 1 W.W.R. 204) but was restored by the
Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan ([1940] 1 W.W.R. 657)., Defendant appealed.
Held: Defendant's
appeal should be dismissed. At the time when the Board formulated and confirmed
its proposal, there was no "debt" owing by defendant to plaintiff
within the meaning of the Act, and therefore defendant was not entitled to the
benefits of the Act. When plaintiff elected to take out a judgment in the form
in which he did in the order nisi, he ceased to have any personal right
against defendant. Sec. 11 (1) of the Act did not aid defendant. After the
order nisi the plaintiff's position was negative that of defendant, if
he wished to retain the land, was positive. Plaintiff had the title to the land
and an order for possession. Defendant had no title and no rights unless he
actively did what the order nisi called for.
[Page 36]
APPEAL by the defendant from the judgment of
the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan which
(reversing an order of Bigelow J. in chambers )
held that, after the issue of a certain order nisi obtained by the plaintiff
in a certain action upon an agreement for sale of land (in which agreement the
plaintiff was the vendor and the defendant the purchaser), there was no
"debt "owing by the defendant to the plaintiff within the meaning of
the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934 (Dom., c. 53), and
therefore a certain proposal formulated and confirmed by the Board of Review
under said Act subsequent to the said order nisi was a nullity, as the
agreement in question was then outside the Board's jurisdiction. The order of
the Court of Appeal restored an order of the Local Master dismissing
defendant's motion for an order vacating and rescinding a writ of possession of
the land issued by the plaintiff. The material facts of the case are more
particularly set out in the reasons for judgment of this Court now reported,
and are indicated in the above head-note. Special leave to appeal to this Court
was granted by the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan. By the judgment of this Court now reported the appeal was
dismissed with costs.
F. P. Varcoe K.C. for the appellant.
R. M. Balfour for the respondent.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hudson J.—The
question in this appeal is whether or not the appellant is entitled to the
benefits provided by the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934, and
amendments. On the 4th of, December, 1933, the respondent agreed in writing to
sell farm lands in Saskatchewan
to the appellant for the sum of $7,500, payable $300 cash, $500 a year for a
number of years and a final payment in 1947, with interest in the meantime at
the rate of 7%. The appellant covenanted to pay these sums and also taxes. The
agreement contained an acceleration clause by which, in case of default, the
total amount should become payable at once. Default was made in payment of
various sums and on the 18th
[Page 37]
of October, 1938, the respondent commenced an
action, alleging that there was due under the agreement as of 1st October,
1938, the sum of $8,804.64, and claiming specific performance of the agreement,
payment of the said sum with interest and, in default of payment, cancellation
of the agreement and forfeiture of all moneys paid thereunder and, lastly,
immediate possession of the lands.
The appellant did not defend and on the 10th of
November, 1938, the respondent recovered a judgment in the form of what is
called an order nisi, whereby the amount due in respect of principal and
interest under the agreement was fixed at $8,804.64, of which sum $4,104.64 was
in arrears. It further ordered the defendant to pay into court to the credit of
the cause on or before the 19th day of February, 1939, the said sum together
with interest thereon, and costs to be taxed. It was further ordered that in
default of payment into court as aforesaid the agreement should be cancelled
and determined and that all moneys paid thereunder by defendant to the
plaintiff be forfeited and retained by the plaintiff. There was a proviso,
however, that on payment of $4,104.64, the sum in arrears, together with
interest, the defendant should be released from immediate payment of so much of
the purchase money as may not have become payable by lapse of time. It was
further ordered that the plaintiff should have immediate possession of the
lands. There was also a provision for rectification of the name of one of the
parties, which is not material to the question here involved.
It is important at this point to determine the
rights of the parties upon the signing of this judgment. It is clear that the
defendant ceased to have right to the possession of the land. It is also clear
that he had a right to the restoration of his position as purchaser under the
agreement of sale upon payment of the sum of $4,104.64, with interest and
costs, and the right to acquire title to the land on payment of the total sum
due, providing one or other of these payments was made within the time
prescribed by the order of the court, or such extension as might thereafter be
given.
The plaintiff became entitled to immediate
possession of the land and he had and retained title to the land,
[Page 38]
subject only to the right of the defendant to
the restoration of his possession as purchaser under the agreement, on payment
of the sum or sums above mentioned.
There remains the question of whether or not the
vendor still retained any right to collect the moneys theretofore due under the
agreement of sale from the defendant personally. It was held by the learned
judges in the court below that he had no longer any such right because he had
elected to take the judgment for cancellation. In arriving at this conclusion,
it is stated by Mr. Justice Gordon, speaking for the court, that in his opinion
this was the effect of the judgment of this court in the case of Davidson v.
Sharpe , and a
decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal delivered by the late Mr. Justice
Lamont in a later case of Primeau and Imperial Lumber Yards Ltd. v. Meagher
. Mr. Justice Gordon further states that
the practice in this Province has been
settled for many years and in my view the plaintiff elected to take an order
for the determination of his agreement with the defendant when he took out the
order nisi in its present form.
It was contended on behalf of the appellant that
the decisions referred to could not be held to deprive the vendor of a right to
collect until after the expiration of the time provided by the order or
judgment for final payment. On consideration, it seems to me that the
conclusion reached by the learned judges in the Court of Appeal is well
founded, and that when the respondent elected to take out a judgment in the
form in which he did, he ceased to have any personal right against the
appellant.
Subsequently to this order nisi and
before the time for payment prescribed by the judgment had expired, the Board
of Review under the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act formulated a
proposal for submission to the defendant and the plaintiff, who was said by the
court below to have been the only creditor of the defendant. This proposal
reduced the amount owing to the plaintiff under his agreement for sale to
$3,000 as of January 1st, 1939, and extended the payments for ten years. The
plaintiff having rejected this proposal, it was confirmed by the Board on
February 21st, 1939. Thereafter, the plaintiff issued a writ of possession and
this was executed by the
[Page 39]
sheriff, who placed the plaintiff in possession.
Following this, there was a motion to set aside the writ before the Local
Master, who dismissed same. The defendant appealed to the Judge in Chambers and
this application was heard before Mr. Justice Bigelow who allowed the appeal
and set aside the writ. From that decision, the plaintiff appealed to the Court
of Appeal, where his appeal was allowed as above stated.
The defendant contends that section 7 of the Farmers'
Creditors Arrangement Act gives the Board of Review authority to formulate
the rights of plaintiffs and argued that there was a debt owing by the
defendant to the plaintiff. The preamble of the Act states in part as follows:
Whereas * * * it is necessary to provide
means whereby compromises or rearrangements may be effected of debts of
farmers who are unable to pay.
The word "debt" is not defined
by the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act or the Bankruptcy Act, but
subsection 2 of section 2 of the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act provides
that expressions in the Act shall be given the same meaning as in the Bankruptcy
Act, unless it is otherwise provided or the context otherwise requires, The
word "debt" is defined in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary as "a sum
payable in respect of a liquidated money demand, recoverable by action,"
and I think that this definition can be accepted as applicable here.
By section 9 of the Farmers' Creditors
Arrangement Act it is provided that subsection 5 of section 16 of the Bankruptcy
Act shall not apply in the case of a proposal for a composition, extension
or scheme of arrangement made by any farmer. Now, section 16, subsections 1 and
5, provide:
The court shall, before approving the
proposal, hear a report of the trustee as to the terms (thereof, and as to the
conduct of the debtor, and any objections; which may be made by or on behalf of
any creditor.
* * *
5. No composition, extension or scheme
shall be approved by the court which does not provide for the payment in
priority to other debts of all debts directed to be so paid in the distribution
of the property of a bankrupt or authorized assignor.
It was argued that the fact that subsection 5
was expressly excluded had some bearing on the interpretation of the
[Page 40]
Act before us, but this I cannot see. In the
argument before us, special reliance was placed on section 11 (1) of the Farmers'
Creditors Arrangement Act as follows:
On the filing with the Official Receiver of
a proposal, no creditor whether secured or unsecured, shall have any remedy
against the property or person of the debtor, or shall commence or continue any
proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act, or any action, execution or other
proceedings for the recovery of a debt provable in bankruptcy, or the
realization of any security unless with leave of the court and on such terms as
the court may impose; Provided, however, that the stay of proceedings herein
provided shall only be effective until the date of the final disposition of the
proposal.
Special emphasis was placed on the words
"or any action, execution or other proceedings for the recovery of a debt
provable in bankruptcy, or the realization of any security unless with leave
of the court." Now it seems to me that this section does not aid the
appellant in the present case.
After the judgment of the court, the position of
the respondent was negative, that of the appellant, if he wished to retain his
land, was positive. The respondent had the title to the land and he also had an
order for possession. The appellant had no title and no rights unless he
actively did what the judgment called for.
I would dismiss the appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Solicitor for the appellant: P. G. Hodges.
Solicitors for the respondent: Balfour, Hoffman & Balfour.