Wilson,
J:—The
issue
in
this
case
is
the
scope
of
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue’s
power
to
demand
information
under
section
231
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63
as
amended.
The
parts
of
the
section
with
which
we
are
concerned
read
as
follows:
231.
.
..
(3)
The
Minister
may,
for
any
purposes
related
to
the
administration
or
enforcement
of
this
Act,
by
registered
letter
or
by
a
demand
served
personally,
require
from
any
person
(a)
any
information
or
additional
information,
including
a
return
of
income
or
a
supplementary
return,
or
(b)
production,
or
production
on
oath,
of
any
books,
letters,
accounts,
invoices,
statements
(financial
or
otherwise)
or
other
documents,
within
such
reasonable
time
as
may
be
stipulated
herein.
(4)
Where
the
Minister
has
reasonable
and
probable
grounds
to
believe
that
a
violation
of
this
Act
or
a
regulation
has
been
committed
or
is
likely
to
be
committed,
he
may,
with
the
approval
of
a
judge
of
a
superior
or
county
court,
which
approval
the
judge
is
hereby
empowered
to
give
on
ex
parte
application,
authorize
in
writing
any
officer
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue,
together
with
such
members
of
the
Royal
Canadian
Mounted
Police
or
other
peace
officers
as
he
calls
on
to
assist
him
and
such
other
persons
as
may
be
named
therein,
to
enter
and
search,
if
necessary
by
force,
any
building,
receptacle
or
place
for
documents,
books,
records,
papers
or
things
that
may
afford
evidence
as
to
the
violation
of
any
provision
of
this
Act
or
a
regulation
and
to
seize
and
take
away
any
such
documents,
books,
records,
papers
or
things
and
retain
them
until
they
are
produced
in
any
court
proceedings.
(5)
An
application
to
a
judge
under
subsection
(4)
shall
be
supported
by
evidence
on
oath
establishing
the
facts
upon
which
the
application
is
based.
1.
The
Facts
The
events
leading
up
to
the
demand
for
information
from
the
appellant
are
relatively
complex
but
the
most
relevant
ones
can
be
stated
fairly
simply.
The
appellant
is
a
commodities
futures
market
broker
in
Winnipeg.
In
October
1974
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
decided
that
it
was
necessary
to
check
on
compliance
with
the
Income
Tax
Act
by
traders
in
the
commodities
futures
market.
In
June
1979,
after
the
appellant
had
queried
the
Department’s
legal
authority
to
demand
from
it
confidential
information
about
its
clients’
affairs
but
had
nevertheless
participated
in
a
feasibility
study,
the
Department
requested
the
appellant’s
magnetic
tape
file
of
their
clients’
commodity
monthly
statements
for
1977
so
that
it
could
process
the
information
on
a
test
basis.
The
Department
guaranteed
confidentiality
of
the
data
during
the
test
period
and
undertook
to
advise
the
appellant
of
any
subsequent
intention
to
use
the
information
in
an
income
tax
compliance
project.
It
also
agreed
to
treat
other
Canadian
commodity
brokers
in
a
similar
way
by
inspecting
their
files
for
use
in
any
such
project.
The
appellant
supplied
the
information
but
with
clients’
account
numbers
only
and
no
means
of
identifying
them.
In
December
1979
the
respondent
requested
the
following
information:
(a)
a
complete
listing
of
office
locations
identifying
each
by
the
office
number;
and
(b)
a
complete
listing
of
customers’
names
and
addresses,
identifying
each
by
account
number.
The
appellant
refused
to
provide
this
additional
information
and
in
May
1980
the
respondent
served
on
the
appellant
a
formal
Requirement
under
paragraph
231(3)(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
requiring
that
this
information
together
with
details
of
all
monthly
transactions
in
1977
as
used
in
the
preparation
of
clients’
commodity
statements,
be
delivered
on
magnetic
tape
to
the
Department
of
National
Revenue.
In
October
1980
similar
Requirements
were
made
for
the
calendar
years
1978
and
1979.
The
validity
of
these
Requirements
was
attacked
by
the
appellant
in
certiorari
and
declaration
proceedings
in
the
Federal
Court.
These
actions,
which
were
consolidated
at
trial,
were
dismissed
by
the
trial
judge
and
an
appeal
to
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
was
also
dismissed.
2.
The
Federal
Court:
Trial
Division
At
trial
Mr
Justice
Smith
held
that
the
demand
for
information
was
made
for
a
purpose
related
to
the
administration
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
raising
of
money
through
income
taxation
was
undoubtedly
within
subsection
91(3)
of
the
Constitution
Act,
1867
and
“raising”
included
not
only
the
imposition
and
levying
of
taxes
but
also
the
taking
of
whatever
steps
were
required
to
ascertain
who
owed
taxes
and
to
collect
those
taxes.
The
Minister
was
seeking
information
to
verify
the
accuracy
of
income
tax
returns
and
this
was
clearly
related
to
the
administration
and
enforcement
of
the
Act.
The
learned
trial
judge
found
that
the
Minister’s
demand
for
information
in
this
case
represented
a
serious
inquiry
into
a
specific
tax
liability
within
the
meaning
of
this
Court’s
decision
in
Canadian
Bank
of
Commerce
v
Attorney
General
of
Canada,
[1962]
SCR
729.
A
specific
person
or
persons
need
not
be
named;
it
was
sufficient
if
they
were
so
described
as
to
be
readily
identifiable.
All
the
customers
or
clients
of
the
appellant
who
had
trading
transactions
in
the
commodity
securities
market
during
the
three
years
in
question
represented
an
appropriately
identifiable
group.
The
learned
trial
judge
also
dealt
with
submissions
made
by
the
appellant
under
paragraphs
1(a)
and
2(e)
of
the
Canadian
Bill
of
Rights.
He
held
that
the
Minister’s
demand
for
information
did
not
interfere
with
anyone’s
right
to
the
enjoyment
of
property
under
paragraph
12(a)
nor
threaten
anyone
with
deprivation
of
that
right.
Moreover,
the
exception
for
due
process
of
law
would
negative
any
such
claim.
As
far
as
paragraph
2(e)
was
concerned,
he
held
that
the
present
proceedings
were
designed
to
ensure
a
fair
hearing
for
the
appellant.
A
conflict
undoubtedly
existed
between
the
right
of
commodities
futures
traders
to
privacy
concerning
their
securities
transactions
and
the
needs
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
to
obtain
the
information
necessary
to
ascertain
and
collect
income
tax.
The
rights
of
the
individual
must,
however,
yield
to
the
efficient
operation
of
government
where,
as
here,
the
situation
was
sufficiently
serious
to
warrant
it.
3.
The
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
In
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
the
appellant
submitted,
relying
on
the
Canadian
Bank
of
Commerce
case,
that
a
Requirement
for
information
under
subsection
231(3)
was
not
for
a
purpose
related
to
the
administration
or
enforcement
of
the
Act
unless
the
purpose
was
to
obtain
information
relevant
to
the
tax
liability
of
some
specific
person
or
persons
whose
tax
liability
was
currently
under
investigation.
It
argued
that
the
Requirements
in
the
present
case
did
not
meet
this
test.
A
Requirement
for
information
concerning
all
the
customers
of
the
appellant
engaged
in
commodity
trading
was
not,
it
submitted,
a
Requirement
related
to
some
specific
person
or
persons
within
the
meaning
of
the
Canadian
Bank
of
Commerce
decision.
Mr
Justice
Le
Dain,
speaking
for
a
unanimous
Court,
held
that
the
judgment
in
the
Canadian
Bank
of
Commerce
case
presented
no
obstacle
to
the
Minister
in
this
case.
The
verification
of
compliance
with
the
Income
Tax
Act
by
the
commodity
trading
customers
of
the
appellant
was
undoubtedly
a
purpose
related
to
the
administration
and
enforcement
of
the
Act
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
231(3),
and
subsection
231(3)
was
within
the
legislative
authority
of
Parliament
under
subsection
91(3)
of
the
Constitution
Act,
1867.
Moreover,
the
Department
was
engaged
in
a
genuine
and
serious
inquiry
into
the
tax
liability
for
some
specific
person
or
persons.
Mr
Justice
Le
Dain
said:
The
judgment
in
Canadian
Bank
of
Commerce
was
based
on
the
agreed
fact
that
the
Requirement
in
that
case
related
to
a
genuine
and
serious
inquiry
into
the
tax
liability
of
some
specific
person
or
persons,
but
I
do
not
read
the
judgment
as
purporting
to
treat
that
as
the
only
valid
purpose
under
what
is
now
section
231(3).
In
any
event
I
am
far
from
certain
that
the
present
case
is
essentially
distinguishable
from
that
on
which
the
majority
of
the
Supreme
Court
based
their
conclusion.
In
the
majority
opinion
of
Carwright
J
the
words
“some
specific
person
or
persons”
are
obviously
understood
as
referring
not
to
a
named
person
but
merely
to
existing
identifiable
persons.
A
reference
to
all
of
the
commodity
trading
customers
of
the
appellant
comes
within
this
meaning
of
the
words.
Leave
to
appeal
to
this
Court
was
granted
and
the
following
questions
settled
by
Order
of
the
Chief
Justice:
1.
Is
Section
231(3)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
SC
1970-71-72
c
63
as
amended,
intra
vires
the
Parliament
of
Canada
under
the
provisions
of
Section
91(3)
of
the
Constitution
Act,
1867?
2.
Are
the
Demands
made
upon
the
Appellant,
James
Richardson
&
Sons,
Limited
under
Section
231(3)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63
as
amended,
void
under
the
provisions
of
the
Canadian
Charter
of
Rights
and
Freedoms!
3.
Are
the
Demands
made
upon
the
Appellant,
James
Richardson
&
Sons,
Limited
under
Section
231(3)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63
as
amended,
void
under
the
provisions
of
the
Canadian
Bill
of
Rights?
The
appellant
appeals
on
four
grounds,
namely:
1.
the
Requirements
are
not
authorized
by
subsection
231(3)
of
the
Act;
2.
subsection
231(3)
of
the
Act
is
ultra
vires
the
Parliament
of
Canada;
3.
the
Requirements
are
void
under
the
provisions
of
the
Charter
of
Rights
and
Freedoms',
and
4.
the
Requirements
are
void
under
the
provisions
of
the
Canadian
Bill
of
Rights.
If
the
appellant
succeeds
on
the
first
ground
as
a
matter
of
statutory
interpretation
then
it
is
not
necessary
to
consider
the
constitutional
issues
raised
in
the
other
three
grounds.
The
argument
on
the
first
ground
proceeds
as
follows.
The
Requirements
made
in
this
case
were
for
“information
returns
respecting
a
class
of
information”.
They
therefore
fell
within
the
ambit
of
sections
221(l)(d)
and
233
of
the
Act.
These
sections
provide:
221.
(1)
The
Governor
in
Council
may
make
information
returns
respecting
any
class
of
information
required
in
connection
with
assessments
under
this
Act,
233.
Whether
or
not
he
has
filed
an
information
return
as
required
by
a
regulation
made
under
paragraph
221(l)(d),
every
person
shall,
on
demand
from
the
Minister,
served
personally
or
by
registered
mail,
file
with
the
Minister,
within
such
reasonable
time
as
may
be
stipulated
in
the
demand,
such
prescribed
information
return
as
is
designated
therein.
Because
paragraph
221(l)(d)
when
read
in
conjunction
with
section
233
confers
an
authority
on
the
Minister
to
demand
only
such
information
as
is
prescribed
by
regulation,
it
either
constitutes
a
particular
rule
within
the
sense
contemplated
in
Pretty
v
Solly
(1859),
53
ER
1032,
which
rule
is
to
be
set
up
against
the
more
general
and
less
restrictive
rule
of
subsection
231(3),
or
else
it
constitutes
an
exception
to
subsection
231(3).
Romilly,
MR
states
the
applicable
principle
in
Pretty
v
Solly,
(supra),
as
follows:
The
rule
is,
that
wherever
there
is
a
particular
enactment
and
a
general
enactment
in
the
same
statute,
and
the
latter,
taken
in
its
most
comprehensive
sense,
would
overrule
the
former,
the
particular
enactment
must
be
operative,
and
the
general
enactment
must
be
taken
to
affect
only
the
other
parts
of
the
statute
to
which
it
may
properly
apply.
Applying
that
principle
in
this
case
the
appellant
submits
that
subsection
231(3)
only
authorizes
demands
for
information
not
contemplated
under
sections
221(l)(d)
and
233.
If
the
demand
is
one
which
falls
within
sections
221(l)(d)
and
233
and
requires
the
authority
of
a
regulation,
then
it
is
excepted
from
the
scope
of
subsection
231(3).
The
appellant
further
argues
that
there
is
a
good
policy
reason
for
the
exception
in
that
subsection
231(3)
is
designed
to
confer
wide
powers
on
the
Minister
in
order
to
facilitate
investigations
of
specific
taxpayers.
These
considerations
do
not
apply
to
demands
made
to
classes
of
persons
for
specific
kinds
of
information
required
in
connection
with
assessments
generally.
The
respondent
counters
these
arguments
by
saying
that
what
is
required
from
the
appellant
is
not
the
“information
returns”
mentioned
in
paragraph
221(
l)(d).
Nor
have
the
demands
for
information
in
this
case
been
made
of
a
“class
of
persons”
as
paragraph
221(l)(d)
requires.
The
respondent
says
that
paragraph
221(l)(d)
contemplates
the
filing
of
information
returns
by
a
general
class
of
persons
on
a
regular
basis
whereas
subsection
231(3)
is
“part
of
the
Department’s
investigating
tools
to
obtain
information”.
Such
tools
are
vital,
the
respondent
submits,
to
a
self-assessment
system.
Nothing,
he
says,
in
either
paragraph
221(l)(d)
or
section
233
prevents
the
respondent
from
requiring
under
subsection
231(3)
information
from
a
specific
commodities
broker
regarding
the
tradings
of
a
specific
group
of
traders
in
commodities
futures
in
respect
of
a
specified
period
of
time.
The
respondent
submits
that
the
case
is
squarely
covered
by
the
Court’s
decision
in
the
Canadian
Bank
of
Commerce
case,
(supra).
The
language
of
subsection
231(3)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
is
unquestionably
very
broad
and
on
its
face
would
cover
any
demand
for
information
made
to
anyone
having
knowledge
of
someone
else’s
affairs
relevant
to
that
other
person’s
tax
liability.
It
would,
in
other
words,
if
construed
broadly,
authorize
an
exploratory
sortie
into
any
taxpayer’s
affairs
and
require
anyone
having
anything
to
contribute
to
the
exploration
to
participate.
It
would
not
be
necessary
for
the
Minister
to
suspect
non-compliance
with
the
Act,
let
alone
to
have
reasonable
and
probable
grounds
to
believe
that
the
Act
was
being
violated
as
required
in
subsection
231(4).
Provided
the
information
sought
had
a
bearing
(or
perhaps
even
could
conceivably
have
a
bearing)
on
a
taxpayer’s
tax
liability
it
could
be
called
for
under
the
subsection.
The
Canadian
Bank
of
Commerce
case,
however,
makes
it
clear
that
the
subsection
is
not
to
be
construed
that
broadly.
It
establishes
through
the
majority
judgment
written
by
Mr
Justice
Cartwright
as:
(a)
the
test
of
whether
the
Minister
is
acting
for
a
purpose
specified
in
the
Act
is
an
objective
one
and
has
to
be
decided
on
the
proper
interpretation
of
the
subsection
and
its
application
to
the
circumstances
disclosed;
(b)
the
obtaining
of
information
relevant
to
the
tax
liability
of
some
specific
person
or
persons
whose
liability
to
tax
is
under
investigation
is
a
purpose
related
to
the
administration
or
enforcement
of
the
Act;
(c)
it
is
not
necessary
that
the
person
from
whom
the
information
is
sought
be
one
whose
liability
to
tax
is
under
investigation;
(d)
the
fact
that
the
giving
of
the
information
may
disclose
private
transactions
involving
persons
who
are
not
under
investigation
and
may
not
be
liable
to
tax
does
not
invalidate
the
Requirement.
The
respondent
acknowledges
that
neither
the
appellant
nor
any
of
its
customers
is
a
person
whose
tax
liability
is
under
investigation
within
the
meaning
of
the
Canadian
Bank
of
Commerce
case.
It
submits,
however,
that
that
is
only
one
of
the
purposes
contemplated
by
subsection
231(3).
The
purpose
in
this
case
is
to
verify
the
accuracy
of
income
tax
returns
made
by
the
appellant’s
customers
who
were
traders
in
commodities
futures.
This
also,
it
submits,
is
a
purpose
related
to
the
administration
or
enforcement
of
the
Act.
I
have
some
difficulty
with
the
respondent’s
submission
in
relation
to
the
Canadian
Bank
of
Commerce
case.
If,
indeed,
the
ratio
of
that
case
is
that
a
demand
for
information
which
meets
the
test
of
being
related
to
a
genuine
and
serious
inquiry
into
the
tax
liability
of
some
specific
person
or
persons
is
a
demand
made
for
purposes
of
the
administration
or
enforcement
of
the
Act,
how
can
it
be
said,
consistent
with
that
decision,
that
a
demand
which
does
not
meet
such
a
test
is
also
for
a
purpose
related
to
the
administration
or
enforcement
of
the
Act?
If
this
is
so,
it
was
pointless
for
the
Court
in
the
Canadian
Bank
of
Commerce
case
to
make
a
genuine
and
serious
inquiry
into
the
tax
liability
of
some
specific
person
or
persons
a
prerequisite
of
the
validity
of
the
Requirement
in
that
case.
Yet
Mr
Justice
Cartwright
makes
it
clear
that
his
judgment
is
premised
on
that
prerequisite
being
there.
After
referring
to
certain
paragraphs
in
the
Stated
Case
he
states
that
it
is
common
ground
“that
the
Requirement
addressed
to
the
appellant
relates
to
a
genuine
and
serious
inquiry
into
the
tax
liability
of
some
specific
person
or
persons”
(p
738).
He
then
makes
the
point
that
the
fact
that
the
answer
to
the
Requirement
may
disclose
private
transactions
involving
a
number
of
persons
who
are
not
under
investigation
and
may
not
be
liable
to
tax
will
not
invalidate
the
Requirement.
He
reiterates
the
purpose
of
the
Requirement
at
739:
The
purpose
of
the
requirement,
then,
is
to
obtain
information
relevant
to
the
tax
liability
of
some
specific
person
or
persons
whose
liability
to
tax
is
under
investigation;
this
is
a
purpose
related
to
the
administration
or
enforcement
of
the
Act.
Accordingly,
while
I
agree
with
Le
Dain,
J
that
the
court
in
the
Canadian
Bank
of
Commerce
case
did
not
say
that
the
purpose
in
that
case,
namely
the
obtaining
of
information
relevant
to
someone’s
tax
liability,
was
the
only
purpose
for
which
a
Requirement
could
validly
be
made
under
subsection
231(3),
it
did
nevertheless
insist
on
a
prerequisite
to
that
particular
purpose,
namely
that
the
someone’s
tax
liability
be
the
subject
of
investigation,
and
it
is
that
prerequisite
which
the
appellant
submits
is
missing
in
this
case.
The
respondent
acknowledges
that
neither
the
appellant
nor
its
customers
are
under
investigation.
It
submits,
however,
that
the
Requirement
is
aimed
at
a
specific
class
of
taxpayers,
namely
clients
of
the
appellant
who
trade
on
the
commodities
futures
market.
That
may
be
so,
but
it
does
not
in
my
view
bring
the
Minister
within
the
purview
of
subsection
231(3).
It
seems
to
me
that
what
the
Minister
is
trying
to
do
here,
namely
check
generally
on
compliance
with
the
statute
by
traders
in
the
commodities
futures
market,
cannot
be
done
by
conducting
a
“fishing
expedition’’
in
the
affairs
of
one
broker’s
customers
under
subsection
231(3)
of
the
Act.
If
the
Minister
seriously
thinks
that
traders
in
the
commodities
futures
market
generally
are
not
reporting
their
transactions
properly
for
income
tax
purposes,
then
he
has
paragraph
221(l)(d)
available
to
him.
He
can
obtain
a
regulation
under
that
subsection
requiring
all
such
traders
to
file
returns
of
their
transactions
in
the
commodités
futures
market.
Having
obtained
such
a
regulation,
he
is
then
in
a
position
to
demand
such
returns
at
large
without
regard
to
whether
or
not
any
specific
person
or
persons
are
currently
under
investigation.
The
very
presence
of
those
provisions
in
the
Act
serves,
in
my
view,
to
support
the
approach
taken
in
the
Canadian
Bank
of
Commerce
case
that
subsection
231(3)
is
only
available
to
the
Minister
to
obtain
information
relevant
to
the
tax
liability
of
some
specific
person
or
persons
if
the
tax
liability
of
such
person
or
persons
is
the
subject
of
a
genuine
and
serious
inquiry.
It
seems
to
me
that
if
the
Minister
wishes
to
conduct
the
kind
of
survey
he
clearly
had
in
mind
in
this
case,
it
is
right
and
proper
that
he
obtain
a
regulation
authorizing
it.
The
business
implications
for
the
appellant
are
serious.
It
agreed
to
cooperate
on
the
basis
that
the
Minister
was
conducting
a
test
and
that
other
commodity
brokers
would
also
be
participating.
If
its
customers
were
less
than
happy
with
their
broker’s
role
as
conduit
to
the
tax
department,
its
competitors
would
be
in
the
same
position.
It
now
finds
that
this
is
not
the
case.
If
the
tax
liability
of
its
customers
or
one
or
more
of
them
were
the
subject
of
a
genuine
inquiry,
then
the
Minister
would
clearly
be
entitled
under
subsection
231(3)
to
single
out
the
appellant
even
although
innocent
taxpayers’
trading
activities
were
disclosed
in
the
process.
But
it
cannot,
in
my
opinion,
be
singled
out
otherwise.
It
cannot
be
compelled
under
subsection
231(3)
to
provide
the
random
sample
for
a
check
on
general
compliance
by
the
entire
class.
This
is
the
purpose
of
sections
221(l)(d)
and
233.
Having
found
that
the
Requirements
are
invalid
under
subsection
231(3)
of
the
Act
as
a
matter
of
statutory
interpretation,
it
is
unnecessary
for
me
to
consider
whether
or
not
they
may
also
be
invalid
on
the
constitutional
grounds
alleged.
It
would
allow
the
appeals
with
costs
both
here
and
in
the
courts
below
and
declare
the
Requirements
directed
to
the
appellant
on
May
8,
1980
and
October
8,
1980
to
be
of
no
force
and
effect.